



Discourse Analysis of “Caliphate Political Islam” in Afghanistan

AMANULLAH SHAFAEI

ABSTRACT: In Afghanistan, we have recently experienced different types of political Islam. What is caliphate political Islam and what are its roots and main elements in Afghanistan? The main idea of this article is to answer the above questions. Findings show that Caliphate Political Islam in Afghanistan has always been present in the background of politics and power in Afghanistan, but in the two periods of 1881 to 1919 and after 1996 it became one of the main actors in the political and social life of this country. In these periods, generally "Caliphate" has been the focal point of the doctrine and the main elements such as the Islamic Emirate, the Amir al-Mu'minin, Sharia, Sunnah, jihad, Pashtunism, Security, and Cosmopolitanism are located around it. In these periods, Caliphate Political Islam has competed with other kinds of political Islam, at times it has succeeded and taken power as the hegemonic discourse in Afghanistan. This Islam lost its credibility through the hegemony of nationalist and liberal-democratic discourses, for the first time at the beginning of the reign of Shah Amanullah (1919) and the second time with the fall of the Taliban regime (2001).

KEYWORDS: Political Islam, Caliphate, Abdul Rahman Khan, Taliban, Afghanistan

INTRODUCTION

The fact is that Afghanistan, since its establishment as an independent state in 1747, has been involved in various forms of Political Islam. In the collection of Afghan Political Islam, from the past to the present, we can enumerate many different types and varieties of Islamism, which due to substantive differences, cannot be grouped under a single discourse. The discourse of Caliphate Political Islam - which this article is responsible for analyzing - is very important among the various types of political Islam in Afghanistan because it is rooted in the political history of Islam and is known as one of the oldest discourses of political Islam in Afghanistan. This kind of political Islam has played an important role in the power equations of Afghanistan in the ups and downs of Afghanistan's political history, especially in the last decades of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and has played a prominent role in Afghanistan's political interactions.

Caliphate Political Islam works like a network. The "Caliphate" is located in the centre, and other important elements are gathered around it. In total, Caliphate-oriented tendencies in Afghanistan, which have been manifested in several historical periods of this country, can be analyzed in the framework of discourse theory and its identity and record can be recognized from other types of Political Islam. It is assumed that Caliphate Political Islam has a separate political nature and identity. Although this kind



of Islam has common elements and implications with other kinds of Political Islam collection, in the end, its political identity will be different from other Islams, including Shariatee and Velayatee Political Islam. The actions of agents of this kind in Afghanistan show that the idea of reviving the Caliphate is still alive for a range of Afghan Islamists.

THE CONCEPT OF CALIPHATE POLITICAL ISLAM

"Political Islam", which, like many political terms, comes from the western world, suffers from a great deal of conceptual unrest. Because this term is often confused with words such as fundamentalism and Islamic Radicalism in the literature of Western and Islamic scholars (Fuller, 2003: X). Regarding the nature of political Islam, Abdul Qadir Odeh believes that Islam is not just a religion, but a religion and a state. According to him, the essence of Islam is such that everything in the Qur'an and Sunnah cannot be realized without the existence of an Islamic state (Odeh, 1981: 79). Abdullah Hussein al-Sadmi, another historian of the Arab world, writes: "*Political Islam is a set of political thoughts and goals that originate from Islamic law*" (Al-Sadmi, 2014: 29). Nazia Ayoubi in her book *Political Islam* also believes that political Islam is a doctrine or movement that believes that Islam has a theory of politics and government (Ayoubi, 1991: 44). During the twentieth century, many types and varieties of political Islam were associated with the issue of power in different countries, which, according to Edward Said, has played an important role in the instability and epistemological complexity of Islamism:

We are talking about Saudi anti-communist Muslims, we are talking about brave Afghan Muslim men, and we are talking about genuine Muslims like Sadat, the Saudi royal family and Zia-ul-Haq. We are talking about Khomeini's Islamic military and Gaddafi's third Islamic way. In Egypt, the Islamic Associations; in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim militias that gather at the Medina Mosque; in Syria, the Associations of Islamic pioneers against the Ba'athist regime; In Iran, the Islamic Mujahideen, the Fada'is and the freedom fighters are all a small part of an opposition movement. (Said, 1981: 60).

Now there are various caliphate trends in the world, and the Taliban in Afghanistan is one of them. Hizb ut Tahrir and ISIS are two other examples. The difference is that the Taliban in Afghanistan have limited the territory of the caliphate within the borders of Afghanistan, but Hizb ut-Tahrir and ISIS do not recognize international borders and seek to establish a global caliphate. Also, the desired caliphate of the Taliban is mixed with Afghan culture and traditions. While ISIS and Hizb ut-Tahrir are more Salafist and want to return to the caliphate system in the style of the time of the Prophet of Islam and his successors. In the following, we will discuss the indicators of the Taliban's desired



caliphate to make the difference between this current and other caliphate's currents clearer.

THE ROOTS OF CALIPHATE POLITICAL ISLAM IN AFGHANISTAN

Dust Mohammad Khan, one of the powerful rulers of nineteenth-century Afghanistan, was the first ruler to call himself "*Amir al-Mominin*" in 1835 (Rashtia, 1957: 61). Dust Mohammad Khan was aware of the miraculous power of the Amir al-Mu'minin. With this tactic, he managed to advance his affairs in the face of the British. Dust Mohammad Khan's use of religious teachings, especially in the face of foreign forces, became a tradition that was followed by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan and his son Amir Habibullah Khan. Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901) perfected the idea of Dust Mohammad Khan. After seizing power, he did not spare any effort to even dream of showing himself as the Caliph of the Prophet of Islam.

After Abdul Rahman Khan, the avoidance of his son Habibaullah Khan (1901-1919) from carrying the title of "King" and being content with the title of "Amir" cannot be justified except as a conscious attribution to a religious source. Habibullah Khan, relying on the same belief and method of his father, considered his power sacred and placed himself among the prophets and said: "A king and a prophet are like two jewels in one ring" (Ghobar, vol. 1, 1985: 1125).

With the rise to power of Shah Amanullah (1919) and the adoption of modernist plans, it took a while for the idea of a Caliphate to emerge, but Habibaullah Kalkani, after ascending the throne (1929), showed that he also longed for the Amir al-Mu'minin. This title was given to him by Hazrat Mujadadi, the leader of Naqshbandi Sufism (Marsden, 2000: 54). Habibullah's rule was short and he failed to implement the Caliphate theory. With Nader Shah coming to power, the caliphate was delayed until the 1978 coup of the People's Democratic Party and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. From this time, political Islam took an organizational form and appeared in various forms.

Mohammad Nader Shah (1930) also had a significant view of the teachings of the Caliphate. In the first proclamation he issued after gaining power, he mentioned the religion of the Messenger of God and gave a religious aspect to all matters (Farrokh, 1992: 516). He forced the dependent Mullahs (clergymen in local dialect), including the Fagheer Takab, to show his great system by writing large sums of money, without giving official titles and positions, and without exposing the government's connection with him, by writing books, pamphlets, and oral and written propaganda. Based on Quranic verses, these mullahs considered him as one of the Caliphs and deputies of the holy essence of God (Haeri, 1995: 205). After the overthrow of the monarchy and the proclamation of the republic in 1973, the idea of a Caliphate disappeared from Afghan thought for several decades, until the rise of the Taliban (1994). In the beginning, this



group focused only on creating security and enforcing the *Shari'a* and avoided creating a political system. But after rapid military victories, Molla Omar considered establishing a government to restore security and religion. After capturing Kabul in 1996, the Taliban called their political system the "*Islamic Emirate*". According to the theoreticians of Jamiat-ul-Ulama, the Islamic Emirate was considered the best option considering Afghanistan's traditional and Sharia-oriented society. Because of the model of the caliphate system in the political thinking of the Taliban, although it is essentially an Islamic model, no Muslim doubts that it is Islamic.

The theory of the Islamic Emirate is fully compatible with the Caliphate. Because this system has followed the path that the Caliphate had followed in the beginning of Islam. As a number of Sunni religious scholars and elites gathered in Kandahar under the name of the Council of Settlement and after the election of Mullah Mohammad Omar as Amir al-Mu'minin, had pledged allegiance to him (Sajjadi, 2001: 229).

In fact, the caliphate group of the Taliban is now the most important representative of political Islam in Afghanistan. This is despite the fact that before the Taliban, two parties "Islamic Jamieat" and "Islamic Hizb" were in charge of this role. Jamiat-e-Islami led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Hizb-e-Islami led by Hekmatyar represented the Muslim Brotherhood in Afghanistan. In fact, Ikhwani parties can be considered the organizational roots of the Taliban in the 1980s. Rabbani and Hekmatyar tried to prove their loyalty to the ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood by translating the books of Hassan al-Banna, Seyyed Qutb and Muhammad Qutb. Rabbani was the most important figure of the Brotherhood, who became the head of the Islamic State in 1992 after fourteen years of war against the Marxist government. Rabbani and Hekmatyar believed that the beliefs and values of the beginning of Islam can be applied in contemporary Afghanistan and have no conflict with the values and beliefs of the world (Roy, 2010: 49-50).

“CALIPHATE” AS THE CENTRE OF THE SYSTEM

In the Caliphate Political Islam, the "Caliphate" is at the focal point. The content of the political literature of the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century shows that the rulers who aspired to the Caliphate were deprived of knowledge about the historical importance and effectiveness of this institution in the political history of Islam. In his view, the terms "Caliph of the Muslims" and "Amir al-Mu'minin" were important because they gave them divine legitimacy. These two concepts are similar but different in some ways. Amir al-Momineen is a general title that even those who do not believe in the theory of caliphate may use it. While the caliph is the one who is the leader of the caliphate system. This



system is a special style of administration that is rooted in the history of Islam. While "Amir al-Momineen" is a title that even kings and emirs use in Islamic societies.

In his view, mythology was more effective in persuading the illiterate masses, who lacked political insight. Therefore, after coming to power, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan did not try to show that the Caliphate system is the oldest political system in the history of Islam. Rather, he pretended that the government under his leadership in Afghanistan was a system like the government of the Prophet of Islam and that the Caliphs after him, were approved and cared for by God. Therefore, he tried to dispel such doubts by putting together such myths and placing himself in the place of saints:

"I saw and heard unseen works from God and I heard a voice. Many horses, numbering about twenty thousand, came gently behind me, as they came closer, the sound became louder until it became clear to me that they had joined my companions." (Abd al-Rahman, n.d: 171).

In the last decade of the twentieth century, the agents of the discourse of Caliphate Political Islam developed a newer and more philosophical version of the Caliphate system. From the study of the content of this version, it appears that the revival of the ideal of the Islamic Caliphate under the title of the *Islamic Imirate* has been very important for the bearers of this idea. This idea, which shows itself in the face of the Taliban, by dividing the world into *Dar ul-Islam* and *Dar ul-Kufr* (Lewis, 1999: 142), believed that the first nucleus of the Caliphate could be placed in *Dar ul-Islam* of Afghanistan and after consolidating its foundations, the territory of the Caliphate spread beyond the borders of Afghanistan. In the Taliban's opinion, Afghan society was suffering from a disease whose medicine was in Islam. From the Taliban perspective, the Islamic Caliphate system under the leadership of Amir al-Mu'minin could better heal the pain of Muslims in Afghanistan than any other system (Marsden, 1379: 86). To this end, the Caliphate succeeded in choosing Amir al-Mu'minin for the "Islamic Imirate of Afghanistan" system through the Settlement Council, and then issued a *fatwa* on the jihad against the jihadist Islamists who ruled parts of Afghanistan (Mojdeh, 2003: 36).

The political history of Afghanistan shows that the idea of the caliphate was raised many times during the period of rulers such as Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901) and Shah Amanullah (1929-1919), but this idea was never implemented. Until the emergence of the Taliban in the 1990s, a system similar to the caliphate was established, which was called the "Islamic Emirate". Although there is a century between these two periods, it is a sign that the Political Islam of the Caliphate, despite appearing in different forms and led by different agents, has a strong presence in the background of Afghan politics. When we examine the record of these Islamist activists in Afghanistan in the context of discourse, it becomes clear that the concept of "Caliphate" is at the center and other important elements are in its orbit.



ELEMENTS OF THE CALIPHATE POLITICAL ISLAM

1-Islamic Imirate

Conceptually, the "*Imirate*" is a model of a political system that can be another face for the Caliphate. In today's usage, the Imirate is mainly referred to as small and autonomous lands in the Arab world, whose ruler calls himself "*Amir*". In Afghanistan, the classical rulers of this country have shown great enthusiasm in using the word "*Imirate*". Before the reign of Shah Amanullah (1919), most Afghan rulers preferred the title of *Amir* to any other title. In the last decade of the twentieth century, at the suggestion of the *Jamiat Ulema* of Pakistan, the title "*Islamic Imirate*" was accepted by the Taliban, and on October 13, 1997, Mullah Mohammad Omar issued a decree naming the Taliban organization "*Islamic Imirate of Afghanistan*." (Farzan, 2010: 216).

For the Taliban, the Islamic Imirate was not the ideal goal of their political system. Rather, it was only the first step in establishing a complete Islamic society. The Taliban had said that they would see the Islamic Imirate in the true sense of the word after their domination of Afghanistan was complete (Shafaei, 2014: 399). The Islamic Imirate, which was considered a model of the Caliphate, also had a historical background in the Islamic world and, for its part, could attract the attention of many Islamic idealists. In addition, according to a researcher in the field of movements:

"The choice of the Islamic Imirate as the only model of legitimate government among other models in the Islamic world and the new world could have other motives. What is more, the placement of an absolute person at the head of a system of government that has no role for the rest of the nation is very similar to the model of the tribal rule system common in Pashtun rural communities. In the model of the tribal administrative system, the head of the tribe is immune from any criticism." (Mousavi, 2011: 115).

2-Amir al-Momenin

"*Amir al-mu'minin*" is a word that differs between Sunnis and Shiites. Shiites believe that the title of *Amir al-Mu'minin* belongs to Imam Ali who was given to him by the Prophet Muhammad. But Sunnis believe that Omar used this title for the first time (Lewis, 1999: 100). With a nostalgic approach to the Caliphate of the Companions, Abdul Rahman Khan believed that mere attribution to its actual meaning (Caliph-Amir) could legitimize his rule. The extravagant emphasis of these rulers on the word *Amir* and the avoidance of the title "king" cannot be justified except by a conscious attribution to a religious source. What is more, the word *Amir* in a way reflects the title of *Amir al-Mo'minin*, which some Caliphs and their representatives in different parts of



the Islamic world used to connect their government to the political systems of early Islam (Shafaee, 2014: 62).

But in the late twentieth century, the founder of the Taliban movement officially earned the title of "Amir al-Mu'minin" in 1996 at a gathering of high-ranking Mullahs in Kandahar. From then on, Mullah Mohammad Omar behaved as if he had relied on the place of the Prophet and the Righteous Caliphs. He symbolically wore the most sacred work in Afghanistan, namely the robes of Prophet Mohammad (Mubarak's Khirgeh), which was in fact the source of the symbolic legitimacy of his power (Milli, 1999: 32). Of course, Mullah Mohammad Omar was well aware that the label of Amir al-Mu'minin would have difficult consequences for him. The first challenge for him was his scientific weakness and low religious education (Korna, 2004: 56), which in the future made it difficult for him to issue a fatwa in the position of Amir al-Mu'minin. But despite this shortcoming, when Mullah Mohammad Omar began to give fatwa, made him a one-year-old ruler who did not give much credit to the advisory council. Because in the Emirate system, the result of the council is not binding on the Amir al-Mu'minin and has only a declarative and informative aspect (Mojdeh, 2003: 51).

3- Pashtunism

In the political history of Islam, being a Quraysh was considered an important condition or preference for the Caliph. But after the transfer of the Caliphate to the Ottoman Turks, many theorists abandoned the Caliphate to Quraysh and focused on other conditions. But in Afghanistan, Religious leaders reconstructed the ethnic element differently. Instead of being Quraysh, they considered Pashtunism as a condition for the survival of the Afghan government. During the reigns of Abdul Rahman Khan and Habibullah Khan, both the Amirs and their successors, considered Afghanistan to be the ancestral home of the Pashtuns and, as a result, their right to rule. Accordingly, the anti-government movements of non-Pashtuns were considered a rebellion against the Caliph and as a result apostasy from the religion. History remembers how the general uprising of the Hazaras (1890-1893) against Abd al-Rahman Khan was suppressed on the charge of revolting against the Amir al-Mu'minin and treated like non-Muslim groups in the early days of Islam (Mousavi, 2000: 157).

Afghanistan's new Caliphs incorporated the element of Pashtunism more nakedly into the Caliphate's Islamic discourse. Undoubtedly, in the intellectual and theoretical foundations of the Taliban, there is a clear trace of the thoughts and ideas of Shah Ouliya, the founder of the Deobandism School. Regarding the Caliphate of Shah Waliullah, like most Sunni scholars, he summarizes the method of establishing the Islamic Caliphate in four cases: the allegiance of the people of settlement, council, installation and domination. Interestingly, he considered one of the characteristics of the Caliph as relative-ethnic honor, which is consistent with the thinking of the Taliban, who consider themselves attributed to a superior ethnic group (Mousavi, 2011: 119).



Olivier Roy, a French expert on Afghanistan, also believes that ethnic-tribal interests strongly influenced the Taliban movement. The majority of Pashtuns joined them even if they did not accept the Taliban. All Pashtun commanders joined and accepted the Taliban without any ideological affiliation (Roy, 2010: 142). The Taliban's harsh treatment of minorities, especially the several large-scale massacres of Hazaras in Bamyan and Balkh provinces, also showed that the Taliban Caliphate saw the Pashtuns' superiority in eliminating and purging non-Pashtuns. Genghis Pahlawan describes it:

Pashtunism is one of the ideological pillars of the Taliban in the management of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Pashtunism refers to a trend that recognizes the blood, tribal, and racial superiority of Pashtuns over other ethnic groups and nationalities in Afghanistan. Pashtunism believes that Afghanistan is a Pashtun land and that other ethnic groups have no rights in it. Therefore, the government and all the destinies of the country should be in the hands of the Pashtuns. Afghanistan is the property of the Pashtuns and they live wherever they want; they put pastures and run the country however they want. (Pahlawan, 1998: 30).

4- Sunnah

The Islamic Caliphate in the history of Islam has always been formed and continued in the context of traditions. This has been especially evident from the time of the Umayyad Caliphate until the end of the Ottoman Empire. Afghanistan was a completely traditional society before the reign of Shah Amanullah (1919) and all political interactions in this country were based on traditions. Abd al-Rahman Khan and Habibullah Khan saw Afghanistan as a large tribe, according to the tradition of power among the Pashtun tribes. Amirs's view of women, confrontation with the opposition, foreign policy, and the legitimacy of the government was another version of the Pashtun tradition that has prevailed in the country for hundreds of years.

The new agents of Caliphate Political Islam also failed to break free from the barriers of tradition. The Taliban have shown that they remain committed to the traditions of Afghan society. To the extent that the leaders of this movement justified or delayed the implementation of the Shari'a when there was a confrontation between them. Concerning women's education, for example, the Taliban had in principle accepted their religious right to education, but due to its incompatibility with Pashtun's zeal (Pashtunwali), they were forced to close the gates of girls' schools. Because in the Pashtun tribal tradition,

"The woman is confined within the framework of the Deobandi religious teachings and the Pashtun tribal tradition, and her honorable life is living in the corner of the house and behind the curtain" (Johnson, n.d: 90).



Pashtunwali is a respected tradition among Pashtuns that includes principles such as honor, hospitality, and hatred. The Shari'a Taliban, unable to comply with the religion, were aware that some of the strict Pashtun provincial rules might not be in line with the religion. The commitment of Afghanistan's New Caliphs to this tradition was evident even in the Taliban's administrative system. Vahid Mozhdeh writes about what is called "*Andivali*":

What set the Taliban's system apart from any other system in the world was the importance of the issue of "*Andivalism*" in that system. The word "Andival" in Pashto and Dari means higher than friend or comrade. It can be said that those who work in a group or team are called together. The Taliban's system had no adaptation to the needs of the government and the structure of a government in the usual way, and this clearly showed that the Taliban did not have a clear plan for a government in mind (Mojdeh, 2003: 44).

5-Jihad

The record of the Caliphs in Afghanistan shows that they have adopted the doctrine of "*Jihad*" in important passages of their political life. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan was the ruler who, between the Pashtun Sunni scholars, was able to activate his government's war under the holy doctrine of Jihad. In fact, the doctrine of Jihad was a trump card given to the Amir by high-ranking Mullahs to suppress his opponents with the label of infidel and apostate. He did not face a particular challenge in dealing with the non-Muslims of eastern Afghanistan (the Nuristanis, one of the ethnic minorities in Afghanistan), but he did not have an easy task with the Hazara Shiites. Therefore, after the work of Amir's troops reached a stalemate in the Hazarajat and met with stubborn resistance from the Hazaras, he was forced to mobilize the Sunni masses under the doctrine of jihad against them under the label of apostasy. By Seyed Askar Mousavi:

The Hazaras were Shiites and Abdul Rahman Sunni calls them atheists. With the help of Sunni mullahs, he was able to declare war on the Hazaras as Jihad, and by obtaining Fatwas from them, he propagated this war as a religious duty for the Sunnis. Abdul Rahman fought in two cases in the name of religion; One against the Hazaras with the title that they are Shiites and the other against the Nuristanis who were considered infidels (Mousavi, 2000: 157).

What Abdul Rahman Khan did in Jihad in the late nineteenth century was repeated by Mullah Mohammad Omar differently in the last decade of the twentieth century. He called the beginning of his uprising in Kandahar against what he called criminals Jihad and called on all religious scholars in 1994 to join the Mujahideen. Mullah Mohammad Omar apply the doctrine of Jihad against those who were the founders of the discourse of Jihad. After hundreds of Pashtun mullahs gathered in Kandahar in 1996 at the



invitation of Mullah Omar to clarify the Taliban's future policies and the religious status of Mullah Mohammad Omar, a high-ranking Mullahs cleric declared that Jihad against the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani was permissible (Farzan, 1389: 151). From then on, Mullah Mohammad Omar in his official signature mentions the words "*Amir al-Momenin*" and "*Mujahid*" before and after his name.

6-Security

Historically, security has been inextricably linked to the Caliphate for two reasons: First, security was the function of the Caliphate, which had the task of providing public security. Second, the establishment of security has played an important role in the legitimacy of the government, and its absence or disruption has been seen as the incompetence of the Caliph and has damaged his sanctity. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Abd al-Rahman Khan made good use of the security element in gaining legitimacy and achieving unity in Afghanistan. He had not inherited a unified and stable government from anyone. Rather, by suppressing the plaintiffs and those he called insurgents, he established central government authority over large parts of Afghanistan. Abd al-Rahman Khan believed that such successes were not the product of human labor and that it was God's providence and grace that, firstly, made him the Amir of the Emirate and, secondly, made him successful in creating national security and public order. He has written:

"When I came to the throne, because there was a state of rebellion in the country, I secretly ordered spies and investigators to report to me whatever was going on among the people, and for many reasons I found those who were loyal and friendly. And I dealt kindly with them, but I completely politicized those who had hostile fantasies and were instigators of sedition and corruption." (Abd al-Rahman, n.d.: 281)

But on this side of the Caliphate discourse, Mullah Mohammad Omar, after completing the work of the arbitrary groups in Kandahar, an aura of holiness emerged around him. He claimed that he was chosen by God and was ordered by the Prophet of Islam to start his uprising against what he described as the loss of security and the disregard of the Shari'a (Milli, 1999: 32). From then on, Mullah Mohammad Omar continuously advised the Taliban security forces to maintain discipline, especially in large cities. For example, after the capture of Kabul (1996) by the Taliban, Radio Shariat addressed all the officials and combat forces of this group:

"The message of the Amir al-Mu'min Mūjahid (Mullah Omar) to the Taliban and all members of the movement in Kabul is to provide security and tranquility for the residents of the capital, who have always suffered from insecurity, and to take any action that threatens the security of citizens." (Sarafraz, 2011: 109).



7-Shariat

In the discourse of the Caliphs, the application of the Shari'a is proof of the efficiency and legitimacy of the Caliphate. Regarding Afghanistan, it can be said that although there is a century between the two claimants to the position of Amir al-Mu'minin, their Shari'a actions are close to each other. The slight difference between Amir Abdul Rahman Khan and Mullah Mohammad Omar is that the former, due to his low interest in religious literacy, formed an assembly of Mullahs who issued Fatwas for Amir's political purposes when necessary. But Mullah Mohammad Omar, despite his incomplete religious education, issued his own Fatwa, and of course, the Mullah approved his Fatwa. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in difficult decisions and important historical stages tried to show that his actions are within the framework of religious rules. When he overcame the nationwide uprising of the Hazaras, within the framework of the religious Fatwas of the court Mullah, he purged them and even tried to justify the issue of enslaving the Hazaras and buying and selling their wives and daughters under Islamic slavery laws. To the extent that by order of the Amir, the judiciary was obliged to register the purchase and sale of Hazara labor and sex slaves in accordance with Sharia law in the judiciary and to pay the tithe of the traded amount as Zakat to the state treasury (Farhang, vol. 1, 1995: 403).

On the other hand, The Taliban have shown that they have stood up for the full implementation of religion. The intensity of the Islamic Emirate regime's action in highlighting the doctrine of Shari'at was such that with the implementation of the strictest Fatwas of the Sunni religions, there was not much room left to justify and soften the Shari'at laws. The Taliban was responsible for enforcing the Shariat law.

"Like the Khavarij, this institution not only did not accept the two principles of insight in religion and insight in practice, but also did not accept to the principle that issues that are not agreed upon by the jurists of the Islamic world should not be included in the unpleasant deeds and people should be persecuted for it." (Mojdeh, 1382: 53).

Mullah Omar was in fact a follower of the School of Isalat al-Horamah³. The sanctity-based view of new phenomena limited the Taliban's social thinking to a theory based on the principle of unauthorized authenticity. In this view, the traces of Salafism and avoidance of new manifestations of contemporary civilization are clearly visible, except in cases where an explicit text on the license is available (Sajjadi, 1998: 243).

8-Cosmopolitan

³ - A theory that considers prohibition as the basis of every Shariah ruling.




Caliphate Islamists seem to have a strong tendency towards secular doctrine. According to the Caliphates, citizenship is a concept based on belief, not geography and the category of the nation-state. In Afghanistan, the first Caliphate did not have the opportunity to express cosmopolitan ideas. But the theorists of the Islamic Emirate during the Taliban period reflected this doctrine in the elaboration of the Islamic discourse of the Caliphate. With the failure of the Mujahideen to establish a centralized government and the rise of the Taliban, a new wave of Arab, Uzbek, and Caucasian fundamentalists entered Afghanistan. They were under pressure in their home countries, and Afghanistan was a safe haven for bases and organizations. For the Taliban, the financial resources and combat forces of the international militants were also important. As a result, Osama bin Laden and hundreds of al-Qaeda-linked militants returned to Afghanistan and were welcomed by Taliban officials. One of the Taliban commanders welcomed Bin Laden and expressed his feelings for him:

O Sheikh! Our land is not the land of Afghans. Rather, it is the land of God, and our Jihad is not the Afghan Jihad, but the Jihad of the Muslims. Your martyrs are present in every part of Afghanistan and their graves testify to this. You are now between your family, your people and your tribe, and we consider the soil on which you walk to be blessed (Ahmadi, 1998: 132-131).

The central point of cosmopolitan was a double win for the Taliban. On the one hand, the Taliban gained legitimacy by harboring al-Qaeda Mujahideen in the eyes of the Islamic world and the Afghan people as the new center of the Caliphate, and on the other hand, the experience, financial resources and combat forces of foreign fighters were effective in advancing their military goals. Ahmad Rashid believes that the Taliban's support for Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda was at their strategic depth. Rashid refers to an event to prove this hypothesis and writes:

The Taliban's support for bin Laden appears to have a strategic place in the Taliban's official policy. When the Saudi ambassador to Kabul (Salman al-Omari) urged Mullah Hassan Akhund to either execute Bin Laden, deport him or extradite him to the United States, he replied: "We respect you because our Giblah is located in the holy land of Saudi Arabia, otherwise your zeal and masculinity are already known" (Rashid, 2001: 131).



Elements of Caliphate Political Islam in Afghanistan

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Caliphate Political Islam in Afghanistan has a long history. Some rulers of Afghanistan in the 19th and 20th centuries were interested in the idea of the caliphate. Therefore, the Caliphate political Islam that has been able to be available intermittently for nearly two centuries must be taken seriously. The past has shown that Caliphate Political Islam has been in Afghanistan. This discourse is currently marginalized, but it should not be overlooked that analysts see a chance for the Caliphs to return to power in Afghanistan.

The Political Islam of the Caliphate in Afghanistan at the end of the twentieth century Afghanistan, which appeared in the face of the Taliban, although more developed and organized than a century ago. However, it must be said that this discourse fell into the lap of Pashtunism on the one hand and its approach to international terrorism, on the other hand, were the two main factors at the end of its credibility. The Taliban's role in establishing an ethnic regime in Afghanistan has turned Afghanistan's multicultural society into an incompatible bipolar one. The survival of the Jihadist Islam discourse by non-Pashtun Jihadist parties, especially in central and northern Afghanistan, was largely due to the Taliban's Pashtun actions. This practice extended the credibility of the discourse of Jihadist Islam belonging to non-Pashtun



ethnic minorities and prevented the hegemony of the Caliphs from spreading. On the other hand, Bin Laden's refuge in Afghanistan and it is becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda led to an international consensus against the Taliban. This consensus was a major factor in the overthrow of the Taliban's regime after 9/11. Now that the Taliban has returned to power in Afghanistan and has revived the "Islamic Emirate" system, the importance of the political Islam discourse of the Caliphate is shown more. This type of political Islam will play a greater role in the future of Afghanistan.

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